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HEALTH RELATED CLAIMS, THE
MARKET FOR INFORMATION, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
J. Howard Beales III t
Food and drug law is replete with restrictions on truthful commer-
cial speech. Drug manufacturers must confine claims about the safety
and efficacy of their products to those the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) has approved for labeling. Food manufacturers may dis-
cuss the relationship between diet and disease if the FDA has deter-
mined that there is "significant scientific agreement" that the claims
are true. Pursuant to FDA guidance, manufacturers may also make
more limited claims to consumers that there is evidence of a diet-
disease relationship, but that such evidence does not rise to the requi-
site level of "significant scientific agreement" regarding the truth of
the claim. Those who say too much, however, risk an FDA finding
that they have made a "drug" claim, and are therefore illegally selling
the food as an unapproved new drug. Other producers, who would like
to inform consumers of a diet-health relationship, are often prohibited
from doing so because their products have too much of some con-
demned nutrient. For example, the food producer cannot explain why
the amount of saturated fat is significant, from a health perspective, in
foods low in saturated fat (as defined by the FDA) but high in total fat
content. Therefore, the high total fat content of the food prohibits this
producer from making a health claim (e.g., "heart healthy-low in
saturated fat").
Most of these restrictions have their roots in regulatory approach-
es that were developed in an era when the Supreme Court held that
commercial speech was not protected under the First Amendment at
all.' Over time, the commercial speech doctrine developed and increa-
singly protected truthful speech from governmental restrictions that
were founded on the notion that it would be better for consumers to
remain ignorant. The FDA has tended to assume, however, that the
doctrine does not really apply to health and safety claims.
t Professor of Strategic Management and Public Policy, The George Wash-
ington School of Business. The author was Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consum-
er Protection from 2001 to 2004.
1 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
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A common metaphor in First Amendment analysis is the "market-
place of ideas." If advocates of competing points of view can make
their best case, free of government regulation, the best and most accu-
rate ideas are most likely to prevail. From an economic perspective,
the rationale for protecting commercial speech from undue govern-
mental interference is the marketplace for information. Part I of this
Article considers the market for information. Part II describes some
issues in the commercial speech doctrine in light of the economics of
the market for information. Part III then reviews the empirical evi-
dence on the importance of the free flow of information in assuring
competitive market outcomes. Finally, this Article offers some con-
clusions.
I. THE MARKET FOR INFORMATION
Information is costly. There are costs of producing information,
such as testing and research, and costs of disseminating information,
such as through advertising or other channels. It costs consumers time
and effort to process, understand, and use the information they obtain.
Because information is costly, it would never be optimal for consum-
ers to become fully informed. Instead, consumers must decide how
much information to obtain. Rational consumers will seek additional
information until the marginal benefits of the added information equal
the marginal costs of obtaining that information. 2 Thus, as the cost of
information increases, rational consumers will choose to obtain less
information.
A. Information and Market Equilibrium
Even with costly information, however, markets can produce
competitive outcomes. Some consumers will be informed about price
or product characteristics. As long as the group of consumers who
seek out a particular item of information is large enough to be worth
competing for, their search will police the marketplace. 3 Because sel-
lers cannot easily discriminate between informed and uninformed
consumers in most circumstances, they must offer a competitive price
(or competitive terms on other product dimensions) if they wish to
2 See generally George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL.
ECON. 213 (1961) (analyzing consumers' search for information and how the search
impacts market price).
3 See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis
of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA L. REv. 630,
633-35 (1979).
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compete for the informed buyers.4 With enough informed buyers, the
equilibrium outcome will be the competitive equilibrium, even though
many buyers choose not to be informed.
Given the importance of the costs of obtaining information, gov-
ernment actions that reduce the cost of information can improve mar-
ket performance. Standardized measuring systems that facilitate prod-
uct comparisons, such as grading systems for meat, standardized
measurements for fuel economy, or nutrition labels, can ease the con-
sumer's task of obtaining information and enhance competition on the
measured dimension.
Although consumers produce a great deal of information as a re-
sult of their own shopping activities, 6 other sources of information are
also readily available. Information is available for purchase from in-
termediaries such as Consumer Reports.7 Consumers can also hire
experts to assist them in finding the product or service that best fits
their needs. They can obtain information from press articles or prod-
uct reviews. Perhaps most important, they can use information that
sellers provide through labels and advertisements-as long as the
government is willing to permit them to do so. The substantial in-
vestments that most firms make in advertising are best understood as
efforts to provide information to consumers. As George Stigler noted,
advertising is "an immensely powerful instrument for the elimination
of ignorance . . . ."8
B. Seller-Provided Information
Seller incentives to provide positive information to consumers are
obvious. Absent regulatory barriers, sellers will tell consumers about
4 Shopping occurs even for the terms of standard form contracts. See J.
Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, The Foundations of Franchise Regulation:
Issues and Evidence, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 157, 163-166 (1995) (reporting evidence on
shopping for standardized franchise contracts); see also James R. Barth, Joseph J.
Cordes, & Anthony M.J. Yezer, Benefits and Costs of Legal Restrictions on Personal
Loan Markets, 29 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357-380 (1986) (providing evidence of shopping
for personal loan terms). The critical role of marginal consumers in determining the
competitive market outcome is discussed in more detail in J. Howard Beales III, Con-
sumer Protection and Behavioral Economics: To BE or Not to BE?, 4 COMPETITION
POL'Y INT'L 149, 152-53 (2008).
s Howard Beales et al., The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information,
24 J.L. & EcoN. 491, 523 (1981).
6 For example, consumers shopping for clothing can obtain information
about such characteristics as price, style, color, and basic fabric composition simply
by examining the product.
See CONSUMER REPORTS, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/index.htm
(last visited February 15, 2011).
8 Stigler, supra note 2, at 220.
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product attributes that consumers desire. When regulatory barriers
restrict the provision of truthful information, either explicitly or effec-
tively, they are likely to reduce consumer welfare.
Sellers also have strong incentives to reveal negative information
about products. Because the absence of a negative characteristic (or
less of the characteristic than competing products) is a positive prod-
uct benefit, sellers that look better on the negative characteristic have
an incentive to reveal that fact. Fat, for example, is generally consi-
dered a negative attribute of a food.9 Sellers of fat free products will
inform consumers of that fact, creating an incentive for sellers of low
fat products to identify themselves, which in turn creates an incentive
for sellers that can only say "less fat" to provide information about fat
content. If consumers who care about the characteristic assume that
sellers who are silent have more of the undesirable characteristic than
those who reveal, there is an incentive for all but the worst product on
that dimension to disclose. Consumers will correctly assume that the
producer who remains silent is the worst. Thus, the unfolding prin-
ciple argues that sellers will voluntarily provide even negative product
information, as long as competing products differ on the characteris-
tic.io
There is clear evidence that the unfolding principle operates in
practice, though it is less clear that disclosure is as complete as the
theory would suggest. Economist Alan Mathios finds that before
mandatory nutrition labeling, all low fat salad dressings disclosed fat
content but high fat dressings did not.11 FTC researchers Ippolito and
Mathios also found nearly complete unfolding for ready to eat cereals,
butter and margarine, but incomplete unfolding for frozen pizzas and
cigarettes. 12
9 For example, the USDA's Dietary Guidelines for Americans recommends
that Americans "reduce the intake of calories from solid fats and added sugars." U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3 (2010), available at
http://www.mypyramid.gov/guidelines/ExecSumm.pdf.
1o See generally Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties
and Private Disclosure about Product Quality, 24 J. L. & ECON. 461 (1981) (develop-
ing the general theory that sellers may voluntarily provide good and bad product
quality information); Paul H. Rubin, The Economics of Regulating Deception, 10
CATO J. 667, 680 (1991) (applying negative product-characteristic theory to advertis-
ing).
1 Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure Laws on Product
Choices: An Analysis ofthe Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECoN. 651, 660 (2000).
12 Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, The Regulation of Science-Based
Claims in Advertising, 13 J. oF CONSUMER PoL'Y 413, 413-45 (1990).
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C. Government Intervention
If information markets are to work efficiently, the information
they provide must be accurate and reliable. Absent some check, a sel-
ler's incentive to overstate the advantages of its offering is
straightforward. Intervention to prohibit false or deceptive claims is
therefore essential.
Government intervention, however, is not the sole force for ho-
nesty in the marketplace. In some circumstances, market incentives
alone are sufficient to assure that information is reliable. With search
characteristics, which consumers can verify on their own prior to pur-
chase, there is little risk of misleading claims.' 3 There is simply no
incentive to misrepresent such characteristics, because consumers will
discover the truth prior to the purchase.
For experience characteristics,' 4 which can only be determined by
trying the product, there is more possibility that misleading claims
will be profitable. For products that are inexpensive and frequently
purchased, however, there is little difference between search and ex-
perience characteristics. The costs of a single trial are low, and seller
profitability is likely to depend on repeat purchases.15 Again, there is
little incentive to engage in misleading claims, because such claims
will not generate repeat purchases once consumers learn the truth.
In many circumstances, the mere fact that a firm advertises is a
source of information about product quality. When sellers depend on
repeat purchases, as they do in many consumer goods markets, they
can signal their quality with investments in advertising.16 These in-
vestments only yield a return if consumers continue to buy the prod-
uct. Investments in advertising thus act as a bond, which the firm will
lose if poor performance leads consumers to stop purchasing the
product. Such investments are an important market incentive to ensure
that firms provide what they promise.17 Similarly, a seller's reputation
is an intangible asset that is at risk from misleading practices, and
provides an important incentive for honesty and fair dealing.'8
13 The distinction between search and experience goods is due to Phillip
Nelson. See Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON.
311,312-14 (1970).
14 id.
15 See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcoN. 729, 730-
31(1974).
6 Id. at 734.
17 See Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. EcON. 615 (198 1).
18 Mark Armstrong, Interactions between Competition and Consumer Policy,
4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 97, 100-107 (2008) (arguing that competition on its own
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The need for enforcement action to police the marketplace is
greatest with claims about credence characteristics.' 9 Most health-
related claims are credence claims, which cannot be fully evaluated
even after purchase. As disagreements among experts make clear,
consumers may find it difficult to evaluate claims about the quality of
expert advice on whether a particular medical treatment was really
necessary or appropriate, or whether the lack of heart disease was
attributable to a diet high in oat bran.
II. THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE AND THE
MARKET FOR INFORMATION
The Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence allows
government restrictions to ensure "that the stream of commercial in-
formation flow[s] cleanly as well as freely." 20 For this reason, the
court has consistently held that misleading or deceptive speech is not
protected by the First Amendment.2 1
This simple and straightforward proposition, however, conceals a
difficult issue that the courts have yet to address in any systematic
fashion: What does it mean to say that a communication is misleading
or deceptive?
Virtually any communication is subject to misinterpretation. If
enough recipients hear or read the message, some of them will likely
take away a meaning that is something other than what the speaker
intended. Moreover, that understanding of the message may be com-
pletely false. This inherent problem of communication is particularly
problematic in the context of marketing messages, which are almost
always brief and presented in times and places where consumers may
not pay full attention. Marketers frequently devote significant re-
sources to refining their advertising to ensure that it effectively con-
veys the intended message, but however straightforward the message
and however careful the execution, some are likely to misinterpret it.
In academic studies of brief communications, some aspect of both
advertising and editorial content is misunderstood by 20 to 30 percent
can often protect consumers); Paul H. Rubin, Regulation of Information and Advertis-
ing, 4 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 169, 175 (2008).
19 See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competition and the Optimal
Amount o/Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1973).
Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) (quoting Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 (1976)).
21 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980).
12 [Vol. 21:7
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of the audience. 22 If regulators insist on communications that cannot
be misunderstood, the result is likely to be communications that are
also uninformative.
In the past, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought to insist
on advertising that was clear enough that "wayfaring men, though
fools" would not misunderstand. This approach to deception evolved
before either the economic or constitutional significance of the free
flow of information was appreciated, and tended to restrict marketers'
ability to provide useful information to consumers. Under this imposs-
ible standard, the FTC challenged advertising for a "permanent" hair
dye on the theory that consumers might think the product would color
hair that had not yet grown out.24 It challenged a one-volume desktop
encyclopedia because it did not in fact contain "[e]verything you've
ever wanted to know-on every conceivable subject." 25 As recently as
1979, it contended that "every body needs milk" was deceptive be-
cause it included those who were allergic to milk, a claim that was
ultimately rejected by the administrative law judge. It was not until
the Commission adopted its Deception Policy Statement in 1983 that
it formally disavowed this line of cases. 2 7 The Policy Statement pro-
vides that only reasonable interpretations of advertising are actiona-
ble: an act or practice is only deceptive if it is likely to mislead con-
sumers acting reasonably in the circumstances about a material issue.
The FTC's "reasonable consumer" or "reasonable interpretation"
standard is ultimately an empirical one, depending on how ordinary
members of the intended audience interpret the message. In practice,
actual copy tests are relatively infrequent because of resource consid-
22 See JACOB JACOBY ET AL., MISCOMPREHENSION OF TELEVISED
COMMUNICATIONS 64 (1980) (noting the statistics of miscomprehension for television
viewers). For print communications, see JACOB JACOBY & WAYNE D. HOYER, THE
COMPREHENSION AND MISCOMPREHENSION OF PRINT COMMUNICATIONS (1987). Both
studies compare advertisements with excerpts of editorial content designed to be
roughly equal in length, and find no significant differences in the extent of miscom-
prehension.
23 Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir.
1944); General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940).
24 Clairol, Inc., 33 F.T.C. 1450, 1457 (1941).
25 Nat'l Comm. for Educ., 39 F.T.C. 171, 178 (1944).
26 Cal. Milk Producers Advisory Bd., 94 F.T.C. 429, 443 (1979).
27 See F.T.C. Policy Statement on Deception (1983), appended
to Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C.1 10, 174 (1984), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmtladdecept.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2010). The
evolution of FTC policy that led to the Policy Statement is discussed in more detail in
J. HOWARD BEALES & TIMOTHY J. MURIS, STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATION OF
NATIONAL ADVERTISING 20-27 (1993), and in J. Howard Beales III, Brightening the
Lines: The Use ofPolicy Statements at the Federal Trade Commission, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1057 (2005).
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erations, but they are often introduced in administrative litigation. The
Commission has never set a bright line standard for the fraction of the
audience that must receive a misleading message. Given the academic
research on miscommunication, discussed above, 20 to 30 percent of
the audience is likely to misunderstand in any event. Since the 1980s,
the Commission has generally not pressed the envelope in the cases it
has actually pursued.
Almost from the commercial speech doctrine's inception, disclo-
sures have been constitutionally favored, 28 and sometimes required in
preference to an outright ban on otherwise truthful speech.29 Such
requirements are often based on the notion that without added infor-
mation, the message would be deceptive. Disclosure requirements are
also adopted because regulators do not trust the unfolding process to
provide sufficient information about negative product characteristics.
Disclosure requirements are common in a number of fields, ranging
from advertising regulation to food and drug regulation to securities
regulation. 30
Government attempts to increase the amount of information avail-
able to consumers may fail to achieve their objectives because of the
negative reactions of consumers or sellers to these regulatory re-
quirements. In fact, such requirements may reduce the amount of in-
formation that is effectively available to consumers. For consumers,
additional information on a product label or in an advertisement may
result in "information overload."" Adding more information will in-
crease the cost of using that information because consumers must read
and understand the entire message to find the items in which they are
interested. If consumers decide that the information is not worth the
effort, they may simply ignore the message. The result may be more
information on the package (or in the advertisement), but less infor-
mation actually received and understood by the consumer. Consumers
may also misunderstand disclosed information, or draw incorrect infe-
rences from the fact that the information is disclosed at all. For exam-
ple, researchers found during an experiment that disclosing the yield
28 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637-38, 646
(1985); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
29 Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650, 659-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
30 For a discussion of the limits of disclosure policies in a number of differ-
ent contexts see Clifford Winston, The Efficacy of Information Policy: A Review of
Archon Fung, Mary Graham, and David Weil's Full Disclosure: The Perils and Prom-
ise of Transparency, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 704, 706 (2008).
31 See JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND, SUMMARY REPORT ON THE FTC
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS CONFERENCE (2007) available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/070914mulhollandrpt.pdf.
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spread premium that mortgage brokers earn reduced consumers' abili-
ty to identify the lowest cost mortgage.3 2
For sellers, disclosure requirements increase the cost of providing
information that might trigger the requirement. Providing some in-
formation about one financing term (such as the interest rate or the
monthly payment), for example, triggers a requirement to provide
more complete information under the Truth in Lending Act. 3 3 Rather
than face the added costs for advertising time or space, sellers may
choose not to provide the triggering information.34 Again, the result
may be that consumers have less information than they did before the
requirement. For example, an FTC requirement that advertisers dis-
close all material details of a warranty whenever any portion of the
warranty is mentioned discouraged advertisers from promoting their
warranties in advertising. Removal of the detailed disclosure require-
ments in 1985 offered the potential for more robust competition over
warranty terms.3 5
Because of the costs of required disclosures, requiring excessive
disclosure may be no different in practice than prohibiting truthful
claims entirely. For example, the FDA's requirements for disclosures
to accompany prescription drug advertising were written with adver-
tising to physicians in mind.36 They required the advertisement to
include a so-called "brief summary" of prescribing information,
amounting to roughly half of a page of fine print in a medical journal
advertisement. When pharmaceutical manufacturers became interested
in advertising on television directly to consumers, this requirement
effectively prohibited advertising. Although the FDA has relaxed its
policy to permit direct to consumer advertising, it has never revised
the underlying regulations.37 The impact of DTC advertising is dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section.
32 JAMES M. LACKO & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, THE EFFECT OF MORTGAGE
BROKER COMPENSATION DISCLOSURES ON CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION: A
CONTROLLED EXPERIMENT 49 (2004) available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/2004/01/030123mortgagefullrpt.pdf.
33 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.16 (2010).
34 See Beales et al., supra note 5, at 527-28 (explaining that in a mandatory
disclosure scheme, providing certain information or making certain claims may "trig-
ger" the requirement to provide additional information, which may discourage certain
sellers from providing the triggering information).
3 BEALES & MURIS, supra note 27, at 36.
36 Michael S. Wilkes et al., Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertis-
ing: Trends, Impact, and Implications, 19 HEALTH AFFAIRS 110, 113 (2000).
3 See Margaret Gilhooley, Heal the Damage: Prescription Drug Consumer
Advertisements and Relative Choices, 38 J. HEALTH L. 1, 17-18 (2005). Rather than
revise the rules, the FDA issued a Guidance Document that allowed broadcast adver-
2011] 15
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III. ADVERTISING AND MARKET PERFORMANCE
A. Advertising and Price
Much of what we know empirically about the impact of advertis-
ing on market competition and consumer welfare arises from studies
of restrictions on advertising in the United States. Prior to the exten-
sion of First Amendment protections to commercial speech, the re-
strictions studied were relatively crude. They often involved complete
prohibitions on advertising sought by professional groups to limit
competition among their members and thereby raise prices. For exam-
ple, one of the earliest studies examined state prohibitions on eyeg-
lasses advertisements. It found that prices were approximately 25 per-
cent higher in states that prohibited advertising, as compared to states
that permitted advertising.3 8 Similarly, states that regulated advertis-
39ing of the retail prices of prescription drugs had higher prices.
Subsequent restrictions on advertising were more subtle, but still
had adverse effects on market performance. For example, attorney
advertising restrictions varied considerably. Some states restricted
broadcast advertising, while others prohibited the use of pictures and
required advertisements to be "dignified." 40 States with more restric-
tions on advertising had higher prices for routine legal services. 4 1 Re-
stricting types of media where advertising is otherwise permitted also
leads to higher prices. The ban on broadcast advertising of cigarettes,
42for example, increased cigarette prices.
tising without including the brief summary. See Guidance for Industry on Consumer-
Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,197, 43,197-98 (Aug. 9, 1999).
38 Lee Benham, The Effect ofAdvertising on the Price ofEyeglasses, 15 J. L.
& EcON. 337, 344 (1972). A number of other studies of markets for eyeglasses and
optometric services have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Deborah Haas-
Wilson, The Effect of Commercial Practice Restrictions: The Case of Optometry, 29
J. L. & ECON. 165, 182 (1986) (finding that "media advertising by optometrists is
associated with lower prices"); John E. Kwoka, Jr., Advertising and the Price and
Quality of Optometric Services, 74 AM. ECON. R. 211, 216 (1984).
3 JOHN F. CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING AND COMPETITION: THE CASE OF
RETAIL DRUGS 11, 20 (1976).
40 Attorney advertising restrictions in place at the time of these studies are
described in WILLIAM W. JACOBS ET AL., IMPROVING CONSUMER ACCESS TO LEGAL
SERVICES: THE CASE FOR REMOVING RESTRICTIONS ON TRUTHFUL ADVERTISING
(1984).
41 John R. Schroeter, Scott L. Smith & Steven R. Cox, Advertising and Com-
petition in Routine Legal Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. INDUS.
ECON. 49, 59 (1987).
42 Robert F. Porter, The Impact of Government Policy on the U.S. Cigarette
Industry, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSUMER PROTECTION ECONOMICS 447, 459
(Pauline M. Ippolito & David T. Scheffmann eds., 1986).
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Even advertising directed at children has been found to reduce
prices. The introduction of television toy advertising was associated
with significant price declines. When advertising was introduced in a
particular city, prices fell; when advertising was withdrawn, they in-
creased again. Similarly, cities where advertising was occurring had
lower toy prices than cities where no advertising was present. 4 3 Simi-
larly, Quebec's ban on television advertising to children has been
found to raise the price of children's cereals in Quebec, compared to
other provinces. Prices for adult or family cereals, however, which
could still advertise, were no higher in Quebec than elsewhere.44
The price effects of advertising do not appear to depend on
whether advertisements actually include price information. Price ad-
vertising has been found to lower prices in studies of retail gasoline
markets,4 5 prescription drugs, and retail liquor stores.46 Restrictions
are also associated with higher prices even where advertising rarely, if
ever, includes price information, as in the studies of cereals, toys, and
cigarettes discussed above. Thus, the critical factor appears to be the
general competitive effects of advertising, rather than the specific
effects of advertising price.
B. Health Claim Regulation and the Market for Information
Regulations on health-related claims for foods provide another
source of data for those studying the impact of advertising regulations
on the market. Such claims discuss the health effects of maintaining
diets high or low in particular nutrients. For example, sellers have
advertised the relationships between dietary saturated fat and serum
cholesterol, as well as calcium and osteoporosis. 47
While information in food advertising is regulated by the FTC,
food labeling is regulated by the FDA. The FTC's approach to health
claims in advertising has always permitted such claims if they were
adequately substantiated. In contrast, the FDA regarded any label
claim about the relationship between diet and disease as a drug claim
until the late 1980s. Unless a seller wished to file for approval as a
43 Robert L. Steiner, Does Advertising Lower Consumer Prices?, J.
MARKETING, Oct. 1973, at 21, 21-26.
4 C. Robert Clark, Advertising Restrictions and Competition in the Child-
ren's Breakfast Cereal Industry, 50 J. L. & ECON. 757, 759-60 (2007).
45 See ALEX MAURIZI & THOM KELLY, PRICES AND CONSUMER INFORMATION:
THE BENEFITS FROM POSTING RETAIL GASOLINE PRICES (1978).
4 Jeffrey Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Price Advertising on Pric-
es: Evidence in the Wake of44 Liquormart, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1081 (1999).
47 See PAULINE IPPOLITO & JANIS PAPPALARDO, ADVERTISING NUTRITION &
HEALTH: EVIDENCE FROM FOOD ADVERTISING 1977-1997 E-8 to -11 (2002) (providing
detailed data on the incidence of various health claims).
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drug, such claims were illegal. In the 1960s, for example, FDA seized
packages of Quaker Oatmeal as a misbranded drug, because the label
discussed the relationship between fiber and serum cholesterol. Al-
though some health claims were made in advertising, they were rela-
tively infrequent until claims were also permitted on food labels.48
Change in the regulatory environment began with an act of civil
disobedience. In 1984, Kellogg developed a marketing campaign for
its high fiber All Bran cereal built around the recommendation of the
National Cancer Institute that diets higher in fiber could reduce the
risk of some kinds of cancer. Although the campaign was in clear
violation of existing FDA regulations, it was developed in conjunction
with the National Cancer Institute-a different part of the Department
of Health and Human Services. FDA declined to take action, and in
1987 it proposed a rule change (later withdrawn) that would have
permitted any health claim that was truthful and not misleading.
Health claims-statements about the specific health effects of nu-
trients or foods-rose from approximately 2-4 % of food advertising
in magazines to a peak of just over 11% of such advertising in 1989.49
In response, Congress passed the Nutrition Labeling and Education
Act of 1990,50 which authorized health claims, but only with prior
FDA approval of the content. The changing rules governing these
health claims have provided a rich environment for studies on the
impact of the content of seller-provided information on markets, as
well as the impact of regulations on seller incentives to discuss certain
product attributes.
Studies of the impact of claims about the relationship between fi-
ber and cancer, which launched the health claims era, found a signifi-
cant market response. The advertising messages led to an increase in
48 See John E. Calfee & Janis K. Pappalardo, Public Policy Issues in Healh
Claims for Foods, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 33, 36 (1991) (discussing the early
history of regulation of health claims); see also IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note
47, at E- Il to -13 (providing key dates for later regulatory developments). The 1990
statute and its proposed implementing rules are discussed in BEALES & MURIS, supra
note 27. The reconciliation of advertising and labeling rules is discussed in J. Howard
Beales, Regulatory Consistency and Common Sense: FTC Policy Toward Food Ad-
vertising Under Revised Labeling Regulations, 14 J. OF PUB. POL'Y AND MARKETING
154, 154-56 (1995).
49 IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at E-8. The study is based on a
content analysis of more than 11,000 food advertisements from 1977 through 1997.
The sample consisted of all food advertisements that appeared in five leading wom-
en's magazines and three of the most popular general readership magazines. Maga-
zine advertising is the second largest category of food advertising in the US. Id at E-
2.
50 Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 21 U.S.C.).
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fiber consumption. In part, the increase was the result of changes in
purchasing patterns, but it was also a result of product changes. Al-
though the weighted average fiber content of breakfast cereals had
been essentially constant for several years preceding the introduction
of the health claims, there was a positive and significant trend toward
increasing fiber after the advertising began. There was no significant
trend in fat or sodium content; the product improvements on the fiber
dimension were not at the expense of deterioration on other aspects of
nutrition. Interestingly, the increases in fiber consumption were great-
est for the most disadvantaged groups. Although fiber consumption
increased for all demographic groups, it increased more among racial
minorities and female-headed households.5 '
One particularly common health claim concerned the relationship
between diet and heart disease or serum cholesterol. Until 1984, such
claims appeared in under 2% of magazine food advertising. After
health claims began in earnest, they rose to appear in just over 8% of
advertising in 1989.52 Most of these claims concerned the relationship
between fat, particularly saturated fat, and heart disease risk. Again,
the increase in advertising claims was accompanied by significant
consumption changes. Although fat and saturated fat consumption
declined slightly between 1977 and 1985, both measures fell far more
sharply between 1985 and 1990.53 Again, information provided
through advertising had a significant impact on the marketplace.
The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990 brought signif-
icant changes to the regulatory environment for health claims. Under
the statute and its implementing regulations, which became effective
in 1993 (for health claims) and 1994 (for nutrient content claims),
health claims were only permitted after prior FDA approval of the
substance of the claim.54 Because the regulations authorize certain
51 PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & ALAN D. MATHIOS, FED. TRADE COMM'N, HEALTH
CLAIMS IN ADVERTISING AND LABELING: A STUDY OF THE CEREAL MARKET, ix-XX
(1989); Pauline M. Ippolito & Alan D. Mathios, Information, Advertising and Health
Choices: A Study of the Cereal Market, 21 RAND J. EcoN. 459, 473-74 (1990).
52 IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at E-10 to -11.
5 Pauline M. Ippolito and Alan D. Mathios, Information and Advertising:
The Case ofFat Consumption in the United States, 85 AM. ECON. REv. 91, 92 (1995);
PAULINE M. IPPOLITO & ALAN D. MATHIOS, FTC, INFORMATION AND ADVERTISING
POLICY: A STUDY OF FAT AND CHOLESTEROL CONSUMPTION IN THE UNITED STATES,
1977-1990 242 (1996).
54 See 21 C.F.R. § 101.14 (2010). The FDA's initial rule implementing the
statute proposed health claims concerning calcium and osteoporosis, dietary fiber and
cancer, sodium and hypertension, lipids and heart disease, lipids and cancer, dietary
fiber and heart disease, folic acid and neural tube defects, antioxidant vitamins and
cancer, zinc and immune function in the elderly, and omega-3 fatty acids and heart
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health claims to include detailed information about the particular rela-
tionship and its significance,ss many companies apparently believed
both must be included in the claim.56 Moreover, the rules sometimes
require lengthy "model claims"57 composed by the FDA and addition-
al information about the relationship.58 The rules also prohibit claims
for certain products with "bad" nutrition profiles. For example, high
fat products were no longer permitted to make claims about the rela-
tionship between fat composition and heart disease. 5 9
These changes resulted in substantial declines in the incidence of
health claims in advertising. From the peak of just over 11% of maga-
zine food advertisements making some health claim in 1989, health
claims fell to under 3% of advertisements in 1992-1994. Claims about
heart disease and serum cholesterol were most dramatically affected,
falling from 8.2% of all advertising in 1989 to zero in 1994.60 A sig-
nificant part of the decline was apparently due to the belief that claims
were required to include the entire, burdensome model claims. When
FDA proposed in 1995 to clarify that the full amount of information
was not required (and the FTC clarified the relationship between the
labeling rules and advertising in 1994), health claims again began to
increase. By 1997, the end of the sample period, health claims again
appeared in 8% of ads, and heart and serum cholesterol claims had
returned to just under 4%.61
Undoubtedly, the category most affected by the new rules was ad-
vertising for fats and oils. In 1988 and again in 1990, 45% of all ad-
vertising for fats and oils included a disease-related claim. These
claims provided information about the importance of fat composition,
particularly saturated fats, to the risk of heart disease. But by 1994,
these claims had entirely disappeared from advertising for fats and
oils, as the regulations required.62
With less ability to explain to consumers why fat composition
mattered, there was also less incentive for fats and oils manufacturers
disease. BEALES & MURIS, supra note 27, at 50 n. 16. Subsequent petitions have led to
authorization for a number of additional claims.
55 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.75(a) (demonstrating the relationship between
saturated fat and heart disease); id. § 101.75(b) (explaining the significance of the
relationship).
56 IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at 100.
5 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 101.77(e) (model claims for relationship between
soluble fiber and heart disease).
5 See, e.g., id. § 101.77(c).
" Id. § 101.75(c)(2).
6 See IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at E- 10.
6 Id. at E-8 to -10.
62 Id. at E-26 to -27.
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to discuss fat composition at all. The total number of advertisements
for fats and oils declined, as did the number of advertisements that
included saturated fat content information. From a peak of twenty
advertisements discussing saturated fat in 1992, the number of adver-
tisements fell to only one in 1997.63 Moreover, there is limited evi-
dence that the shift in the informational content of advertising resulted
in changes in the marketplace. With less information about both satu-
rated fat content and its importance to health, consumer choices
shifted toward cooking oils with more saturated fat and less monoun-
saturated fat.6
Requirements for specific disclosures to accompany claims often
create particularly heavy burdens for comparative advertising claims,
simply because there is often more that can be disclosed-the number
describing the advertised product, the competitive product, and the
absolute or comparative difference in the measurement. Although
always useful, and arguably necessary to prevent deception in some
circumstances, it is very difficult to argue that a truthful comparison is
always misleading in the absence of this full set of information. None-
theless, the food labeling regulations generally require more informa-
tion to accompany comparative claims about nutrient content, even
though such claims are particularly likely to facilitate consumer
choice. With the exception of comparative claims about total fat con-
tent, comparative claims generally declined in frequency after the
rules took effect.
One such example is claims about calorie content and calorie
comparisons. Part of the theory of the regulatory changes was that if
consumers just focused on fat, calories would take care of themselves,
because fat is so high in calories. Thus, the regulations made claims
about fat content relatively easy, and claims about total fat content
increased after the rule. Calorie and diet claims, however, decreased,
falling from a peak of 22.5% of all food advertisements in 1991 to
12% in 1997. Comparative calorie claims, subject to further disclosure
requirements, fell even more, from a peak of 11.2% of ads in 1989 to
a low of 1.2% in 1995.66 The FDA succeeded in shifting the focus
from calories to fat, but the increase in obesity since 1990 certainly
raises questions about whether that was really an improvement.
6 Id. at E-28.
6 Alan D. Mathios, The Importance of Nutrition Labeling and Health Claim
Regulation on Product Choice: An Analysis of the Cooking Oils Market, 27 AGRIC. &
RESOURCE ECON. Riv. 159 (1998).
65 See IPPOLITO & PAPPALARDO, supra note 47, at E-6.
6 Id. at 188 (Table B-1) (explaining that comparative calorie claims re-
bounded slightly, to 3.4% of ads in 1997).
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The paradoxical effect of the changes in the rules governing
health claims was that an effort to fine tune the information available
to consumers resulted in the provision of less information about im-
portant product characteristics. Each individual claim that appeared
may have been more complete and informative, but the aggregate
number of health claims decreased because sellers wished to avoid the
new regulatory burdens. Advertising claims about relevant health cha-
racteristics of products generally became less common. The promi-
nent exception was claims about total fat content. Although prohibited
for certain products, total fat claims were less burdened than other
claims, and their frequency increased after the regulations took ef-
fect."
The health claims experience makes clear that sellers have impor-
tant incentives to provide information in competitive markets, even
when the information is "bad." That information has consequences in
the marketplace, affecting both consumer choices and the nature of
product offerings. The intense competition in the fats and oils catego-
ry based on fat composition, for example, is easy to understand from
the perspective of the economics of information. For consumers inter-
ested in changing the fat composition of their diet, the place to start is
with fats and oils, not with products that have little fat in the first
place.6 Sellers have an incentive to compete for the business of such
consumers, in part by providing relevant information.
Recently, the FDA has demonstrated a renewed interest in health
claims, featuring a return to its pre-1984 position that health claims
could convert a food into an unapproved new drug. In 2009, it issued
a warning letter challenging Cheerios packaging claims that "you can
Lower Your Cholesterol 4% in 6 weeks," and that "Cheerios is ...
clinically proven to lower cholesterol."6 9 The package also included
an FDA-approved health claim about the relationship between soluble
fiber and the reduced risk of coronary heart disease, but the FDA took
care to argue that the challenged cholesterol claims were "presented as
separate, stand-alone claims through their location on the package and
" Id. at E-4.68 Indeed, when the FDA subsequently proposed to require labeling of trans
fat content, it relied in part on a cost benefit analysis indicating that it was fat compo-
sition, not total fat content of the diet, that influenced heart disease risk. See Food
Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and
Health Claims, 64 Fed. Reg. 62,746, 62,763 (Nov. 17, 1999) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt
101).
69 Warning Letter from Charles Becoat, Dist. Dir., U.S. FDA, to Ken Powell,
CEO, General Mills (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/iceci/enforcementactions/warningletters/ucml 62943.htm.
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other label design features." 70 FDA's approach is inconsistent with the
long-established approach to advertising interpretation, which recog-
nizes the need to examine "[t]he entire mosaic . .. rather than each tile
separately."n Instead, the FDA divided the label into its component
tiles, distinguishing the "health claim" tile that it permits from the
"drug claim" tile that is prohibited.
It is difficult to see how this challenge can withstand First
Amendment scrutiny. FDA alleges that the claims are "drug claims,"
but it does not allege that they are misleading. Absent the specific
quantitative information and the reference to clinical trials that appar-
ently converts Cheerios into a drug, it seems far more likely that con-
sumers would overestimate the significance of fiber in reducing cho-
lesterol, rather than underestimating the importance of the relationship
that FDA agrees exists. The added information would appear to en-
hance consumer understanding, not reduce it. From the perspective of
the market for information, this is the kind of seller-provided informa-
tion that policy should seek to encourage, not prevent. The First
Amendment should do the same.
Nor is it clear how the restriction can survive as a valid restriction
on truthful commercial speech under the test the Supreme Court first
articulated in Central Hudson. Under the Central Hudson test, the
restriction must directly advance a substantial governmental interest
and be no more restrictive than necessary. 72 Although there is undoub-
tedly a governmental interest in protecting public health through the
drug approval process, preventing the possibility that the next Lipitor
will come to market cleverly disguised as a breakfast cereal does little
to advance that interest. The drug approval process seeks to prevent
serious risks from potential side effects that can be fatal. There is
simply nothing akin to these risks in the choice of which cereal to eat.
The drug approval process might also be defended based on the need
to prevent ineffective treatments, which might lead consumers to fo-
rego effective alternative therapies. With foods, however, there is
simply no evidence that consumers rely on dietary changes in prefe-
rence to medical treatment for the kinds of conditions that have been
the subject of health claims. Breakfast choices simply do not pose the
kinds of risks that the drug approval process seeks to prevent-
70 id
71 FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674 (2d Cir. 1963).
72 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S 557, 566
(1980). Although the Court has become more protective of truthful commercial
speech over time, it has continued to employ the Central Hudson test. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367-68 (2002).
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particularly when it is conceded that the soluble fiber in oats will in-
deed reduce serum cholesterol.
More fundamentally, the drug approval process itself poses
challenges for a First Amendment analysis. Requiring prior approval
before a product is marketed does not implicate First Amendment
values, but much of what the FDA does under the authority of the
approval process goes considerably beyond that. The process deter-
mines not only what can be sold, but also what can be said about
products the government allows into the marketplace. This is com-
mercial speech, and there is logically room for a great deal of speech
that is truthful and not misleading, but beyond the confines of the
FDA-approved labeling. Because a product is approved for a particu-
lar indication, there is a connection between speech and the process of
deciding whether a drug provides benefits sufficient to justify the risks
it may impose. An FDA concerned about protecting the drug approval
process should seek to narrow its restrictions on truthful speech to
those that are essential complements of the approval process. It is dif-
ficult to see how restricting truthful claims about Cheerios protects the
integrity of the process in any meaningful way. Absent such a connec-
tion, however, the restriction is not "a means narrowly tailored to
achieve the desired objective."n
C. Advertising and Prescription Drugs
Although direct to consumer (DTC) advertising has grown sub-
stantially in recent years, most promotional spending for drugs is still
directed to physicians.74 From its inception, the practice has been con-
troversial, and has been banned in most other countries.75 That con-
troversy increased considerably in the wake of the Vioxx recall, a
drug that had been heavily promoted through DTC advertising. In-
73 Bd. of Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
74 One study estimated that DTC advertising accounted for approximately
14% of total promotional expenditures for prescription drugs in 2005. Julie M. Dono-
hue, et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357
NEw ENG. J. MED. 673, 675 (2007); see also Cong. Budget Office, Promotional
Spending for Prescription Drugs, 2 & n.2 (Dec. 2, 2009) available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/105xx/doc 10522/12-02-DrugPromoBrief.pdf (estimat-
ing that DTC advertising accounted for just over 20% of promotional expenditures in
2008, but unlike Donohue et al., did not include the value of free samples in its mea-
surements).
7 See R.L. Kravitz & R.A. Bell, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Pre-
scription Drugs: Balancing Benefits and Risks, and a Way Forward, 82 CLINICAL
PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 360, 360 (2007).
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deed, the recall led to proposals to ban DTC advertising or to delay its
use until a drug had been on the market for some period of time.76
A number of surveys of patient and physician attitudes toward
DTC advertising have been conducted," but survey responses may
not reflect the actual behavior of either group. Better evidence of the
impact of advertising comes from studies relying on market data and
actual behavior in the marketplace. DTC advertising is used for a rela-
tively small number of drugs. Based on data from 1996-1999, adver-
tising to consumers was more likely for new drugs, for more impor-
tant drugs (those that receive priority reviews), and for under-treated
diseases with large numbers of potential patients. 78 Because consum-
ers may not seek treatment if they are unaware that an effective thera-
py exists, they may particularly benefit from learning about drug
treatments. Thus, advertising is more likely for precisely the types of
products that consumers are most likely to benefit from learning
about-important new drugs for under-treated conditions.
There is evidence that DTC advertising may lead to increased
treatment. A study across drug classes found that DTC advertising
increased physician visits, with every twenty-eight dollars of DTC
advertising resulting in one additional visit in which a drug is pre-
scribed within twelve months. 79 Other studies have examined adver-
tising in particular drug markets, with several studies examining the
marketing of a class of drugs that reduce cholesterol, collectively
known as statins. The first study of this market, using aggregate data,
found small or insignificant effects of advertising on the total number
of prescriptions for statins.80 Subsequent studies using more disaggre-
gated data, however, have found significant effects. A widespread
concern about many drug therapies is that patients may not take their
medicine as regularly as they should. It is therefore noteworthy that
DTC statin advertising appears to increase compliance with a pre-
scribed regime. Moreover, advertising for one brand increases com-
76 See David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-To-Consumer Drug
Advertising, 41 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 259, 278 (2007).
77 See generally JE Calfee, An Assessment ofDirect-to-Consumer Advertis-
ing ofPrescription Drugs, 82 CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 357 (2007)
(describing surveys of consumers and physicians).
7 Toshiaki lizuka, What Explains the Use of Direct-to-Consumer Advertis-
ing ofPrescription Drugs?, 52 J. INDUS. ECON. 349, 373 (2004).
7 Toshiaki lizuka & Ginger Zhe Jin, The Effect of Prescription Drug Adver-
tising on Doctor Visits, 14 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 701, 703 (2005) (analyzing a
sample of 151 drug classes over seventy-two months, from 1994-2000).
8 John E. Calfee et al., Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the Demand for
Cholesterol-Reducing Drugs, 45 J.L. & ECON. 673, 680-81 (2002).
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pliance for patients using competing products as well.81 Some of the
increase in compliance may occur because patients are more involved
in the decision about their therapy when there is more advertising, and
some may occur because the advertising reminds patients to take their
medicine. Higher levels of statin television advertising were also as-
sociated with improvement in the likelihood of attaining cholesterol
management goals, particularly for patients with the least restrictive
goals.82 This result is consistent with improved compliance as a result
of DTC advertising. 8 3
Other studies have examined the market for antidepressants,
which have also been extensively advertised. A study using insurance
claims data found that patients diagnosed with depression during pe-
riods when DTC advertising was high were more likely to initiate
medication therapy, an effect that was not present for detailing or free
samples. DTC advertising was also associated with an increase in the
number of patients who received the appropriate duration of therapy.84
Another study, using survey data on medical expenditures, also found
that advertising increased the likelihood that consumers would initiate
antidepressant therapy, but did not increase utilization among those
already taking the medications. As the authors noted, "this is consis-
tent with a promotional campaign that seems to alert consumers to the
product's existence."
Although there have certainly been fears that DTC advertising
might result in inappropriate prescribing, there does not appear to be
systematic, market-based evidence to support that fear. A controlled
trial of antidepressant prescribing used actors pretending to be suffer-
ing from either major depression or adjustment disorder. The authors
viewed an antidepressant prescription as appropriate in the first condi-
tion, but not in the second. The actors either requested a specific drug,
requested a drug treatment generally, or made no request. Among
81 Marta Wosinska, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Drug Therapy
Compliance, 42 J. MARKETING RES. 323, 324 (2005).82 W. David Bradford et al., Effects of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of
Hydroxymethylglutaryl Coenzyme A Reductase Inhibitors on Attainment of LDL-C
Goals, 28 CLINICAL THERAPEUTICS 2105, 2105, 2116 (2006).
83 See Olivier Armantier & Soiliou Namoro, Prescription Drug Advertising
and Patient Compliance: A Physician Agency Approach, 6 ADVANCES ECON.
ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1545 (2006) (finding that improved compliance has also been
reported for glaucoma medications).
Julie M. Donohue et al., Effects of Pharmaceutical Promotion on Adhe-
rence to the Treatment Guidelines for Depression, 42 MED. CARE 1176, 1179-80
(2004).
Chad D. Meyerhoefer & Samuel H. Zuvekas, The Shape ofDemand: What
Does It Tell Us about Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Antidepressants?, 8 B.E. J.
EcoN. ANALYSIS & POL'Y, no. 2, 2008, at 1.
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patients with major depression who requested a drug generally, 98%
received "minimally acceptable initial care," compared to 90% who
asked for a specific drug and only 56% of those who made no drug
request. Patients with adjustment disorder, for whom a prescription
was less clearly warranted, were also more likely to receive a drug in
response to a specific or general request, which may suggest some
over prescribing in this case.86
Studies have also examined the promotion of COX-2 inhibitors
such as Vioxx. One study found consistent and statistically significant
effects of advertising on the number of osteoarthritis patient visits,"
suggesting that the advertising led to treatment for patients who would
not otherwise have received it. A separate study by several of the
same authors found that increased Vioxx advertising was associated
with reduced wait times between diagnosis and the beginning of
treatment, although Celebrex advertising was associated with longer
delays. Moreover, patients who were better candidates for COX-2
inhibitor therapy had shorter delays when there was more advertising.
In contrast, patients with contraindications had longer delays.88 It is
difficult to square these systematic studies with the more popular per-
ception that these drugs were associated with widespread, inappro-
priate prescribing.
A recent study examined the relationship between reported ad-
verse drug reactions and pharmaceutical promotion and advertising
for drugs to treat arthritis pain, depression, high cholesterol, and aller-
gies.89 It found that DTC advertising was associated with more ad-
verse drug reactions for arthritis pain medications and depression
medications, but not for drugs for high cholesterol or allergies. For
arthritis pain drugs, promotion to physicians was also significantly
related to adverse drug reactions. Moreover, the effect of promotion to
physicians was greater than the effect of DTC advertising. A one
standard deviation increase in detailing expenditures increased ad-
verse drug reactions by 60%, but a one standard deviation increase in
DTC advertising increased such events by 20%. For cholesterol drugs,
promotion to physicians was associated with fewer adverse drug reac-
86 Richard L. Kravitz et al., Influence of Patients' Requests for Direct-to-
Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 293 JAMA
1995 (2005).
8 W. David Bradford et al., How Direct-to-Consumer Television Advertising
for Osteoarthritis Drugs Affects Physicians' Prescribing Behavior, 25 HEALTH AFF.
1371 (2006).
88 W. David Bradford et al., The Effect of Direct to Consumer Television
Advertising on the Timing of Treatment, 48 ECON. INQUIRY 306 (2010).
8 See Guy David et al., The Effects of Pharmaceutical Marketing and Pro-
motion on Adverse Drug Events and Regulation, AM. ECoN. J., Nov. 2010, at 1.
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tions. 90 Particularly given the differences in results across drug cate-
gories, the study provides little basis for general restrictions on DTC
advertising.
The more recent argument for restrictions on DTC advertising,
growing from the Vioxx recall, is that when drugs are first introduced
on the market, there is inevitably a risk of side effects that were not
detected in clinical trials.9' This risk is unavoidable, because relatively
low probability side effects may be more than sufficient to justify
removing a drug from the market, but cannot reliably be detected in
any feasible premarket trials. Instead, they can only be identified after
substantial numbers of patients have used the drug. Until we have
accumulated this experience base, there is more risk in prescribing a
new drug for a particular condition than in using an older drug with a
better-understood risk-benefit profile.
Prohibiting or delaying advertising, however, would simply pro-
long the time it takes to accumulate the necessary experience. Sup-
pose, for example, we cannot detect a particular side effect until one
million patients have used the drug for some period of time. Until that
experience is accumulated, we will not know the side effect exists. To
be sure, patients who are early adopters of the new drug will be at
risk. Restricting advertising, however, simply means that it will take
longer to accumulate the necessary experience base because manufac-
turers cannot tell consumers about the product. The first million pa-
tients will be at risk in either case, but the risk will be spread out over
a longer period of time.
Moreover, consumers who do not know the drug exists may con-
tinue to suffer from an untreated condition, particularly if they have
tried and rejected the "conventional" therapies for the condition. Be-
cause the government's decision to allow the drug on the market re-
flects a conclusion that the benefits of the product are sufficiently
great to justify its known risks (and presumably the unknown risk of
unrecognized side effects as well), it is difficult to see any justification
for denying those benefits to willing consumers simply because they
lack information about the product's availability. This is rationing of
the availability of the latest medical treatment based not on risk, but
on governmentally enforced ignorance. Such a policy is not consistent
with the First Amendment.
* Id. at 19-20.
91 See Vladeck, supra note 76.
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CONCLUSION
The free flow of information is critical to the effective perfor-
mance of competitive markets. In turn, markets are a vital servant of
consumer welfare. Markets reveal what is important and what is not.
Regulators decide something is, or should be, important to consumers
and impose it, whether by regulating the product itself or by requiring
additional information. Markets respond rapidly to changes in prefe-
rences and changes in circumstances. Regulations tend to remain in
place indefinitely, whether or not they remain worthwhile or even
relevant. Markets synthesize and reveal information systematically;
regulators frequently make decisions with only limited information
available about the true costs and benefits of their actions. Markets are
driven by the marginal consumer, who is indifferent between purchas-
ing and doing without the product. Competition for the marginal con-
sumer determines the competitive price and product characteristics,
which in turn offer significant consumer surplus to most consumers.
Regulatory choices are driven by preferences of the average consum-
er, pricing some out of the market entirely and leaving others with less
consumer surplus than they would otherwise have realized.
To be sure, real markets are imperfect, and intervention can im-
prove their performance. The goal of intervention, however, should be
to enhance market performance, not to supplant market outcomes.
Interventions can reduce the costs of obtaining information, or ensure
the reliability of information that is provided. They can also, however,
suppress information that is valuable to consumers and that sellers are
willing to provide.
Intervention in markets for information is often particularly
tempting. Restrictions on the flow of information generate little in the
way of direct compliance costs, and can provide a politically attractive
way to address a difficult substantive problem. For example, restrict-
ing DTC advertising to address the inherent problem that rare but im-
portant side effects can only be detected after a drug has been on the
market for some period of time will do little to change the underlying
risks. Restrictions on truthful speech, however, provide a questionable
"solution" to the problem.
Whether from a First Amendment or an economic perspective,
keeping consumers ignorant is rarely an appropriate solution to a mar-
ket problem. Precisely because information is both valuable and cost-
ly, policy should seek to enhance its flow to those who need it. More-
over, an understanding of the impact of even seemingly innocuous
interventions such as disclosure requirements should inform the legal
analysis of restrictions on speech. Properly applied, the commercial
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speech doctrine should prevent undue interference in the market for
information.
